America The Vulnerable: The Problem of Duplicate Voting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Government Accountability Institute (GAI) attempted to obtain public voter roll information from all 50 states to independently test for duplicate voting in the 2016 presidential election. Duplicate voting is one type of voter fraud, defined as an individual casting more than one ballot. There are currently no government agencies or private entities that compare all state voter rolls to detect duplicate voting fraud.

GAI partnered with two reputable data analytics firms to perform the voter roll comparisons and duplicate voting matches. However, GAI was unable to conduct a comprehensive review since a complete data set of state voter rolls is currently unobtainable. Access to public voting data varies widely among state elections officials. Some share it freely, while others impose exorbitant costs or refuse to comply with voter information requests.

Despite significant data acquisition obstacles, the reliability of acquired data, and an extremely conservative matching approach that sought only to identify two votes cast in the same legal name, GAI found 8,471 highly likely duplicate votes.

• GAI obtained voter roll data from 21 states, amounting to 17 percent of all possible state-to-state combinations.
• Using an extremely conservative method of matching names and exact birthdates with other unique identifying information, GAI found 7,271 highly likely cases of inter-state duplicate voting. We identified another
1,200 cases of likely intra-state duplicate voting. Each instance represents two votes with the same voter information.

• According to GAI’s commercial database consultant, “The probability of correctly matching two records with the same name, birthdate, and social security number is close to 100 percent. Using these match points will result in virtually zero false positives from the actual matching process. If there are false positives, they would most likely be the product of errors in data sourcing and/or human error at the polling places.”

• Extending GAI’s conservative matching method to include all 50 states would indicate an expected minimum of 45,000 high-confidence duplicate voting matches.

• In the process of identifying potential duplicate votes, GAI found more than 15,000 voters who registered to vote using prohibited addresses, such as post office boxes, UPS stores, federal post offices, and public buildings.

• Using Rhode Island as a test-case, GAI and Simpatico Software Systems discovered voter identity loopholes that likely transfer to other states.
INTRODUCTION

In May 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order establishing the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. The commission is tasked with promoting free and honest federal elections and has requested publicly available data from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as feedback on how to improve elections integrity.\(^1\)

"The integrity of the vote is a foundation of our democracy; this bipartisan commission will review ways to strengthen that integrity in order to protect and preserve the principle of one person, one vote," Vice President Mike Pence, the commission’s chair, announced.\(^2\)

The request for publicly available voter registration data and voter history data from state Secretaries of State has sparked a firestorm of controversy in light of President Trump’s claim that he lost the national popular vote in 2016 to Democrat Hillary Clinton due to three million illegal votes.\(^3\) Many states have resisted the commission’s request for data, claiming that it is searching for a voter fraud problem that doesn’t exist. Other states have readily complied.

Specifically, the commission has asked for names, dates of birth, the last four digits of social security numbers, and information relating to felony convictions and military status. In Colorado, elections officials have observed a record number of withdrawn voter registrations.\(^4\)

In 2012, Pew Research found 24 million (one in eight) voter registrations were either invalid or significantly inaccurate. About 1.8 million deceased voters were discovered on state voter rolls, and 2.75 million
people were registered to vote in more than one state. These findings alone do not equate to voter fraud, but show a system rife with error and vulnerability.

Elections are sometimes decided by small margins, making voter roll accuracy of paramount importance. Consider the 2000 presidential election between Gov. George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore. More than 105 million votes were cast nationwide, and the outcome was determined by only 537 votes. The election, and the course of history to follow, hinged on the state of Florida where the margin of victory for Bush amounted to only .009 percent of the state’s total votes.

In 2008, a U.S. Senate election in Minnesota pitted incumbent Sen. Norm Coleman against Al Franken. The election was initially too close to call. After an eight-month legal battle, Franken emerged victorious by only 312 votes and officially joined a 60-senator filibuster-proof supermajority that passed the Affordable Care Act. Countless other federal, state, and local elections have been decided by narrow vote margins, and all of them are consequential.

Irrespective of partisan politics, it is critical to ensure that the U.S. election system is open to as many eligible citizens as possible, and that every effort is taken to ensure honest votes are not undermined through either government negligence or voter fraud. Voter fraud is defined as illegal interference with the process of an election. It can take many forms, including voter impersonation, vote buying, noncitizen voting, dead voters, felon voting, fraudulent addresses, registration fraud, elections officials fraud, and duplicate voting.
With this in mind, GAI attempted to independently research and verify instances of duplicate voting in the 2016 general election, defined simply as an individual illegally casting more than one vote. This can occur within the same state, in separate states, or when more than one vote is cast in an individual’s name—indicating identity theft. We attempted to obtain and compare every states’ voter roll to determine whether duplicate voting may have occurred. To the best of our knowledge, the undertaking would have been the largest duplicate voting detection effort ever.

There is currently no organization, governmental or private, that is tasked with performing this type of simple cross-check for all 50 states. There is also no requirement that states work together to eliminate duplicate voter registrations or check for possible illegal duplicate federal election votes. States can voluntarily engage with a nonprofit organization called the Electronic Registration Information Center, or ERIC. It currently assists 20 states with resolving duplicate registrations and helps register new voters. ERIC does not look for voter fraud.

GAI was unable to complete the project as initially designed as it is currently impossible for independent research organizations, much less the executive branch of the federal government, to obtain voter rolls from all 50 states. Exorbitant costs, excessive hurdles, and outright rejected requests for information prevented a complete analysis. GAI was able to obtain voter roll data from 21 states at little or no cost, which represents about 17 percent of all possible state-to-state comparison combinations.

In partnership with two data analytics firms, GAI applied an extremely conservative matching approach to eliminate any reasonable
possibility of including false positive matches. Our method ensures the integrity of our results while overlooking many less certain duplicate votes. We further attempted to identify duplicate votes cast in the same legal names. If an individual was inclined to illegally double vote using different names, our analysis would not detect it.

GAI identified 8,471 high-confidence duplicate voting matches. GAI also found several irregularities that increase the potential for voter fraud, such as improper voter registration addresses, erroneous voter roll birthdates, and the lack of definitive identification required to vote.

These issues merit immediate attention and are of bipartisan concern. We list our limited findings on the following pages and recommend the 8,471 cases of likely duplicate voting be investigated for possible wrongdoing.

SIMPATICO and VIRTUAL DBS

GAI partnered with Simpatico Software Systems and Virtual DBS, Inc. to perform the state-to-state voter roll comparisons and duplicate voting matches. Simpatico is a U.S.-based company specializing in large-scale database analytics. Among other projects, it works with state governments by applying waste and fraud analyses to health and human services programs to achieve program integrity and taxpayer savings. We set out to determine if fraud analytics techniques could be applied to voting data to detect whether duplicate voting occurred in the recent general election.

GAI’s voter roll project involved the acquisition of voter registration and voter history data from as many states as possible. Ultimately, data from
21 states comprising 75 million 2016 general election voters were loaded into a single system. Simpatico performed its research using a technique called “Agile Analytics,” which combines data mining with forensic analysis.

Virtual DBS is a commercial database firm that aggregates hundreds of business and consumer demographic variables to identify specific commercial prospects. Applying the firm’s additional data points, which include the first five digits of social security numbers, to pools of voters with matching names and exact birthdates effectively confirmed the existence of duplicate voting.

“The probability of correctly matching two records with the same name, birthdate, and social security number is close to 100 percent. Using these match points will result in virtually zero false positives from the actual matching process. If there are false positives, they would most likely be the product of errors in data sourcing and/or human error at the polling places,” said Brad Mitchell, Chief Executive Officer of Virtual DBS, Inc., (see Appendix B).
DATA ACQUISITION

Difficulties Acquiring Data

GAI was unable to obtain voter roll data from all 50 states (despite rigorous efforts). There is a wide range of availability and cost for voter registration and voter history records between states. Many provide such information at little or no cost, while others make it effectively impossible to obtain data for independent research.

GAI requested records for all voters in state voter registration systems and at least five elections of voter history when available. We did not request or obtain confidential information such as social security numbers, drivers’ license numbers, and passport information. We did not attempt to determine the outcome of any votes.

The voting data supplied to GAI includes the first, middle, and last names of voters when fully available. The information also includes birthdates containing the day, month, and year of birth when available. Each state charged less than $5,000 for its data. GAI obtained records from Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.

Costs and Hurdles

Some states charge exorbitant fees. Alabama and Arizona each charged GAI nearly $30,000. Wisconsin charged $12,500, and other states
charged between $5,000 and $10,000. States like Virginia and South Carolina wanted payment on a per-election basis, making the cost of GAI’s request five times higher than many other states.

New Hampshire and Illinois maintained that public voter roll data is only available to duly registered political entities. Virginia, Indiana, Massachusetts, and several others states deny access to public voter registration data and voter history data with the exceptions of political parties and law enforcement. The Kentucky Board of Elections considered GAI’s application for voting records and summarily rejected it.¹³

Massachusetts only provides voting data to law enforcement agencies and political parties, but as an alternative allows for separate requests to be made to each of the state’s 351 cities and towns—many of which charge for voting data and would likely supply it in varying formats. Simpatico Software Systems determined the effort would require six times the attention needed to obtain similarly requested data from every other state combined. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 mandates that every state maintains a centralized statewide database of voter registrations.¹⁴ In effect, Massachusetts and other states withhold this data from the public.

Data Quality

The quality of information provided to GAI varied widely. Some states’ data required Simpatico Software Systems to make extensive formatting adjustments for the information to be imported into a single, usable analytics platform. Sometimes the data was unreliable.
New York state voting data had significant quality issues resulting in part from outdated technology. According to Simpatico, there is no way to determine with certainty how many votes were cast in the 2016 general election based on the data provided. Too many descriptions are used to classify 2016 general election votes from a sound analytics perspective. Examples are “2016 General Election,” “2016 November General,” “2016 General State/Local Election,” “11/8/2016 General Election,” and two dozen other voting labels.

More than one thousand different descriptions were used for all separate elections in the records provided to GAI, and many descriptions pertained to the same elections. Local voting systems appear to feed into a larger centralized voter registration system, and refer to individual elections in confusing ways. More than 700,000 votes in New York’s data are labeled “General Election,” with no corresponding year to indicate which general election the votes were cast. If the state cannot reliably account for votes in a consistently clear manner, it is possible that election outcomes could be affected.

Other Problems

In the absence of social security numbers and drivers’ license numbers, full birthdates are critical information items to verify voter eligibility and voter identity. Birthdates are also necessary to perform duplicate voting research. Only about half of all states would provide full birthdates with voter registration data, if they provided any data at all. If a state did not provide a full date of birth, GAI did not use its data.
The information GAI received did not always lead to the potential for high-probability results. It would have been useful to cross-check voter rolls between adjacent states and those with transient population relationships. For example, North Carolina and Florida are reciprocal travel destinations. However, North Carolina’s voter roll data was unobtainable. GAI was only able to cross-check three of seven Southeastern states, all of which have reasonably substantive travel relationships.

Acquiring voting data from neighboring states was also difficult. Neighboring states present an opportunity to cast duplicate votes for those inclined to do so. GAI was unable to compare some high population states with adjacent states, such as Arizona and Nevada with California, Wisconsin and Indiana to Illinois, and Texas with Louisiana.
DUPLICATE VOTING ANALYSIS

Identifying likely examples of duplicate votes

Methodology

GAI looked for duplicate voting matches by comparing 21 available state voter rolls, offering about 17 percent of all possible state-to-state pairings. Twenty-one states yield 210 unique combinations of pairs of states, while all 50 states would yield 1,225 unique combinations. GAI also looked for duplicate voting within each of the 21 states.

We began by identifying instances of general election votes with matching names and exact birthdates (day, month, and year). This alone does not guarantee two votes were cast by the same person. Identical names often occur in large voter datasets, and matching names and exact birthdates can occur as a matter of coincidence. This is known statistically as the "birthday problem." GAI recognizes the birthday problem and removed the uncertainty by taking the additional step of running the pool of potential duplicate voting matches through Virtual DBS’s commercial database to confirm the voter identities. Virtual DBS applied credit reporting data, social security administration data, and other commercial data such as magazine subscription information.

GAI used full first and last names, “fuzzy” middle names, and exact birthdates. Fuzzy matching allows for slight variations to be considered when the item is either missing or incomplete. Fuzzy matching applied to partial middle names, full middle names with matching middle initials, and exact matches of all other criteria when middle names were missing. We also
considered middle names differing by no more than two letters. High-confidence matches generally decrease the fuzzier the middle name, but the likelihood of confirmable duplicate voting matches remains very high given the exact matching of additional identifying criteria.

The analysis only applies to potential duplicate votes that were cast using the same name and identifying information. Our approach does not identify individuals who may have cast more than one ballot using different names. The Institute’s findings do not automatically prove that matched voters committed voter fraud, as voter or election official error and voter identity theft cannot be ruled out.

Ideally, all voters would provide strong identifying information at the point of registering to vote to eliminate identification uncertainties, such as social security numbers, drivers’ license numbers, or passport documents. These items comfortably substantiate the unique identity of individual voters, but are regularly not submitted when registering to vote. GAI did not attempt to obtain such confidential information.

*Matches for Inter-State Duplicate Voting*

GAI’s initial analysis revealed more than 60,000 name and birthdate matches for potential inter-state duplicate voters. These could not be confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt using the data supplied by the 21 states. Virtual DBS evaluated the voter matches using additional unique identifiers and found 7,271 high-confidence matches.

Another method employed was the matching of out-of-state mailing addresses. Eligible voters are required to list residential addresses as the
main address on voter registration forms. Every state we examined also allows for secondary mailing addresses to be listed. We looked for instances where voters listed secondary addresses in different states than their residential address. If a name and birthdate match also showed that voter’s out-of-state secondary mailing address matched the residential address from a different state, or vice versa, then we considered it a strong likelihood that two votes were cast in the name of the same individual. Nearly 600 duplicate matches were found using this technique.

GAI also looked for pairings of voters, or cases where individuals appeared to vote together in separate states. The odds of two individuals with matching names and birthdates voting together in two different states dramatically increases the likelihood of an inter-state duplicate voting match. We found nearly 200 pairs of voters who appear to have voted as couples in two different states. We also identified two families of three that may have voted together. The identities of the pairings of voters and those with duplicate matching addresses were confirmed through Virtual DBS’ commercial database.

GAI applied fuzzy first names to the analysis and found nearly 350,000 possible duplicate voters. Incorporating fuzzy first names presents a far weaker level of certainty than the fuzzy middle name matching method previously described. When these potential matches were conservatively cross-checked through the commercial database, another 315 duplicate voting matches were confirmed.
Matches for Intra-State Duplicate Voting

GAI included fuzzy middle names with matching first and last names and exact birthdates to identify possible intra-state duplicate voting. The commercial database cross-check revealed 1,200 high-confidence double votes from an initial pool of 10,000 intra-state matches.

In one case, two votes were cast in the same Oregon town with matching names and dates of birth. It is remotely possible these votes were cast by two different individuals. A closer look at voting registration records show one voter registered with a residential address, and the other to a business address. An evaluation of business filings lodged with the Oregon Secretary of State’s office revealed that the business address listed on multiple department filings was also the residential address of the individual with the same exact name and birthdate. This is a high-confidence case of duplicate voting and was further confirmed through the commercial database.
IMPROPER ADDRESSES

Using Prohibited Addresses for Voter Registration

Through the process of identifying duplicate votes, GAI discovered several important voting-related irregularities. One such area pertains to improper voting addresses. Eligible citizens are required to register to vote using a residential address, defined as a fixed or permanent address where an individual physically resides all or most of a given year. Knowingly submitting a fraudulent address is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

GAI found more than 15,000 clearly prohibited addresses within the 21-state voter rolls we examined. While some may be mistakes, all are easy to identify from an elections integrity perspective. The lack of attention from elections officials may increase the potential for voter fraud.

Election laws specifically prohibit the use of post office boxes to meet the residential address requirement. However, GAI found 6,539 general election votes were cast by individuals who registered to vote using a post office box as a primary residential address. This mostly occurred in Pennsylvania, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. GAI also found an additional 3,000 voters who listed federal post office buildings as their home address.

GAI further discovered nearly 5,000 general election voters who registered to vote using UPS stores as residential addresses. This occurred in every state in our analysis. In some cases, more than 100 voters were registered to the same UPS store locations. GAI found another 1,000 votes
that were cast by individuals who listed public buildings as their home address. Public safety building addresses can sometimes be used to protect law enforcement, judges, and other officials from exposing their home addresses. We did not include any of these scenarios in our findings. We also found cases of voters whose home addresses matched the addresses of gas stations, vacant lots, abandoned mill buildings, basketball courts, parks, warehouses, and office buildings.

BIRTHDATES

Simpatico Software Systems boundary tested the 21-state voter registration records contained in its custom engineered database. Boundary testing, or boundary value analysis, is a method that determines maximum or minimum values, such as the maximum or minimum age of voters.

The analysis showed 45,880 votes were cast by individuals whose dates of birth were more than 115 years prior to the 2016 general election. It is important to note that some state registration systems indicate a missing date of birth by adopting filler dates, such as 01/01/1900, 01/01/1850, or 01/01/1800. The vast majority of votes cast by individuals appearing to be over 115 years old had these three erroneous birthdates. The analysis showed 1,410 voters had other dates of birth indicating an age of over 115 years old. Forty-five of these voters had birthdates earlier than the year 1700. Additionally, 292 votes were cast by voters whose registration birthdates indicated they were under 18 years old at the time of the election, with 128 of these votes being cast provisionally.
VOTER IDENTITY

Help American Vote Act

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 is a major federal election reform law that was enacted in the aftermath of the highly contentious 2000 presidential election. More than 105 million votes were cast nationwide, and the deciding margin of victory was just 537 votes. It passed Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support and was signed into law by the election’s winner, President George W. Bush.

One of the Act’s reforms is a requirement that eligible voters use definitive forms of identification when registering to vote. Valid drivers’ license numbers and the last four digits of an individual’s social security number were newly required for all subsequent registrants. Pre-HAVA registered voters are exempt. The Act also allows for other forms of identification to be submitted, some being less reliable than others. Alternative forms of identification include state ID cards, passports, military IDs, employee IDs, student IDs, bank statements, utility bills, and pay stubs. States can offer additional identification options. GAI discovered a surprising number of active voters whose identifying information contained in state voter registration systems is less reliable than the driver’s license and social security number standard. The less exacting the form of ID, the more difficult it is to verify an individual’s identity if an elections official was inclined to do so.
**Identification and Rhode Island Voting**

GAI and Simpatico Software Systems analyzed Rhode Island’s general election system as a manageable test-case for potential voter identity issues. What we discovered may broadly apply to other states.

According to data supplied by the Rhode Island Secretary of State’s office, 466,499 votes were cast by Rhode Island voters in the 2016 general election. More than 30 percent, or 143,111 votes, were cast by individuals who did not register to vote with either a social security number or driver’s license number; 120,822 registered before HAVA, and 22,389 registered after HAVA. The post-HAVA general election voters who registered without using drivers’ license or social security numbers equate to 4.7 percent of all Rhode Island voters. Confirming the identities of some of these voters is impossible using only the data contained in the state’s voter registration system as there are no other uniquely identifying pieces of voter data.

The potential consequences of undetected identity fraud or ineligible voting are significant. Nine of 113 Rhode Island state legislative races were decided by margins of victory that were less than the number of post-HAVA voters in those respective districts who did not supply verifiable forms of identification when registering to vote.

**The Rhode Island Test-Case**

The possibility that an individual could register to vote without providing strong personally identifying information led GAI to consider whether voter fraud could occur. Simpatico Software Systems proposed the
following scenario to the Rhode Island Secretary of State’s office, to which Simpatico received an affirmative response.23

If a voter registration form was submitted by an individual with the name John Jacob Jingleheimer Schmidt, with a birthdate of 1/1/1970, a residential address that was a commercial office building, no driver’s license, no social security number, and the registration form was sent to the appropriate elections office by mail, would this application be approved and added to the Rhode Island state voter roll? The Rhode Island Secretary of State’s office said yes, with the caveat that the registration validation process is performed at the local level.

A letter would be sent by the U.S. postal service to the address provided on the voter registration application. If the letter is not returned as undeliverable, then the applicant is duly registered and no further checks would be performed unless the registration was challenged by a person or entity outside of government. If the letter was returned as undeliverable or if the improperly listed commercial business returned the letter with a postal comment that the registering individual did not live at that address, then the application would be put on hold.

Assuming the John Jacob Jingleheimer Schmidt voter application was approved, the individual claiming to be Schmidt would need to provide a photo ID to obtain a state-issued voter ID card in order to then cast an actual vote. Schmidt could obtain a voter ID card by submitting a wide range of identity items that fail to meet the social security number and driver’s license number threshold outlined in the federal HAVA law, such as a gym membership photo ID. Simpatico proposed that the individual claiming to
be Schmidt provided a photo ID from a nonexistent business. According to the Rhode Island Secretary of State’s office, the individual would be granted a voter ID card.

Another way the individual claiming to be Schmidt could attempt to vote illegally is to arrive at a voting poll without identification and cast a provisional ballot, a required option under HAVA. Rhode Island’s voter ID laws allow for provisional ballots to be confirmed by nothing more than a matching signature on a voter ID card—which in Schmidt’s case was submitted without uniquely identifying information.

**Broader Potential Consequences**

The vulnerabilities exposed in Rhode Island transfer to other states. Without uniquely identifying information submitted at the voter registration stage, the potential for voter fraud increases. Put another way, there is no way to confirm a voter’s identity or citizenship without it.

To further the Rhode Island test-case, Simpatico submitted a list of 225 general election voters who registered using clearly prohibited addresses. Simpatico’s request to fully verify the identities of the individuals required a “voter challenge,” according to state elections officials. It were further informed that a false challenge could carry the risk of a misdemeanor penalty, (see Appendix A).
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

GAI was unable to obtain voter roll data from all 50 states, but nevertheless identified 8,471 potential cases of illegal duplicate voting across 21 states. These instances should be investigated to determine whether two votes were cast by the same person or if identity theft occurred.

GAI was unable to perform a complete cross-check of state voter rolls due to the wide range of availability of data between states. GAI did not seek to obtain confidential information such as drivers’ license numbers and social security numbers which should be guarded by elections officials. We only sought basic voter identifying criteria such as full names, birthdates, and addresses, and we were able to obtain it at little or no cost from many states. Others make it too expensive or virtually impossible to obtain. This information must be made available across-the-board for bipartisan independent voter integrity research.

States should also prioritize the accuracy of voter information contained in voting databases. Removing improper addresses, updating procedures to eliminate deceased voters from voter rolls, and confirming the identities of individuals during voter registration are necessary reforms to alleviate the potential for voter fraud. At a minimum, states should upgrade their database technology to better account for voting data, where appropriate.

GAI, in consultation with Simpatico Software Systems, recommends additional studies be performed. The following list presents important steps forward, but is not meant as a comprehensive solution:
• Likely fraud analysis by type of voter registration
  o Statewide voter registration systems should track how voters registered to vote. None of the data we obtained contained this information. Examples of voter registration types include (depending on the state): Department of Motor Vehicles, in-person, by mail, by third party, online, and others. Evaluating likely voter fraud by voter registration type would provide valuable insight into whether certain avenues of voter registration produce more fraud than others.

• Likely fraud analysis of primaries for federal races
  o Felony penalties for voter fraud apply to primaries for federal elected offices as well as general elections. We did not attempt to review any primary elections. One issue to look for, in addition to duplicate voting, would be whether individuals are voting in primaries in one state and general elections in another state.

• Maiden name/married name duplicate voting and/or duplicate registrations
  o In some state voter registration systems, name changes will generate new voter registrations and leave former names, such as maiden names, active in the system.
  o Confidential data such as drivers’ license numbers and social security numbers are required to electronically identify these
registrations, and to check for duplicate voting. In our Rhode Island test-case, and likely in other states, this confidential data does not always exist in the statewide voter registration system. Thus, the analysis is impossible to perform.

- Extended, national study of votes by registrations citing only commercial addresses.

- Secure assessments of duplicate voting using confidential identification.

- Confirming citizenship using the Federal Data Hub—a database provided by the federal government to confirm “proof of legal presence” in order to receive social service benefits like Medicaid.

- Confirming that Green Card holders are not casting votes by cross-checking them using a federal database.
The Problem of Duplicate Voting 2017

5 http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregistrationpdf.pdf
8 https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf
10 http://www.ericstates.org/
11 http://simpaticosoftware.com/about/
12 https://www.virtualdbs.com/
13 letter from Kentucky Board of Elections (Appendix C).
14 http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/hava.html
17 Ibid.
19 https://www.rockthevote.com/get-informed/elections/frequently-asked-questions/
20 http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/hava.html
22 Rhode Island emails (Appendix C).
23 Rhode Island emails (Appendix C).
APPENDIX A
Rhode Island Improper Addresses

In the course of GAI’s duplicate voting study, Simpatico Software Systems supplied the Rhode Island Board of Elections office with a list of 225 Rhode Island voters who registered to vote using improper addresses, such as UPS stores, empty lots, warehouses, gas stations, etc. Our intention was to document how these irregularities might be resolved.

A representative from Simpatico met with the Executive Director of the Board of Elections and a top elections official from the Rhode Island Secretary of State’s office on three separate occasions. It was explained that the Board of Elections would take action by requesting local Boards of Canvassers to determine whether the 225 voters lived at their listed addresses. The canvassers would send letters to each address. If a response is not received, then the voter’s registration is put on hold and no further actions are taken.

The Board of Elections opted against directing local canvassers to perform any further actions to verify the identity of the individuals despite the authority to do so. Additional verification would require a “voter challenge.” The Board suggested the Simpatico representative personally challenge each of the 225 voter registrations with improper addresses. A false challenge can carry the risk of a misdemeanor penalty.

The relevant statute reads: “Every person who willfully and maliciously challenges the registration of a voter without reasonable cause to suspect that the voter is not qualified shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall, in addition, be liable to the challenged voter for compensatory and punitive damages as well as for his or her counsel fees. The mere fact that a challenge was not sustained by the board shall not give rise to any civil or criminal liability of the objector.”

The Simpatico representative did not personally challenge the registrations. The risk involved was too high, and the scenario is perhaps instructive as to why some voter integrity efforts go no further than sending a letter.
Voter Fraud Matching Accuracy

The probability of correctly matching two records with same name, birth date and SS# is close to 100%. Using these match points will result in virtually zero false positives from the actual matching process. If there are false positives, they would most likely be the product of errors in data sourcing and/or human error at the polling places.

Brad Mitchell  
Chief Executive Officer  
Virtual DBS, Inc
Mr. Ken Block  
Simpatico Software Systems, Inc.  
20 Altieri Way, No. 3  
Warwick, RI 02886  

Dear Mr. Block:  

The Kentucky State Board of Elections received your Request for Voter Registration Data.  

The Board is charged with the duty of assuring that voter registration data is submitted to only those individuals who qualify pursuant to the requirements of KRS 117.025(3)(h). This statute provides that the Board shall:  

Furnish at a reasonable price any and all precinct lists to duly qualified candidates, political party committees or officials thereof, or any committee that advocates or opposes an amendment or public question. The State Board of Elections may also furnish the precinct lists to other persons at the board’s discretion, at a reasonable price. The board shall not furnish precinct lists to persons who intend to use the lists for commercial use.  

In your request, you state that Simpatico Software Systems, Inc. requests the voter registration because you are “conducting electronic research to determine the prevalence of voters voting in multiple states for the 2016 general election.”  

Simpatico Software Systems, Inc. is not a “qualified” person as provided in KRS 117.025. On April 18, 2017, the Kentucky State Board of Elections reviewed and considered your request. The Board voted to deny your request as the stated purpose does not meet the exceptions to commercial use set forth in 31 KAR 3:010.
If you have future inquiries, please do not hesitate to contact our office.

Sincerely,

Maryellen Allen  
Executive Director  
State Board of Elections
From: Rob Rock [mailto:rrock@sos.ri.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2017 1:54 PM
To: 'Ken Block' <kblock@simpaticosoftware.com>
Subject: RE: Checking in on my request

Ken,
Below are the numbers you requested. I don’t believe that anyone who registered before the Help America Vote Act would have their DL or SS information in our system. Also, before the voter ID law took effect, anyone who did not have a DL or SS on file would have had to show ID before voting. Now, everyone must show ID.

Rob

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Total Voters : 230,537

Total voters who voted in November 2016 Presidential election and don’t have SSN and DMV are 143806.

Rob Rock
Director of Elections
RI Department of State  |  Secretary of State Nellie M. Gorbea
Email: rrock@sos.ri.gov  |  Website: www.sos.ri.gov  |  Twitter: @RISecState
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Our Mission: The Rhode Island Department of State engages and empowers all Rhode Islanders by making government more accessible and transparent, encouraging civic pride, enhancing commerce and ensuring that elections are fair, fast and accurate.
From: Rob Rock [mailto:rrock@sos.ri.gov]
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 3:07 PM
To: 'Ken Block' <kblock@simpaticosoftware.com>
Subject: RE: Proof of Citizenship

I don’t know for sure about other states but I am pretty sure others states are in the same boat we are.

Rob Rock
Director of Elections
RI Department of State | Secretary of State Nellie M. Gorbea
Email: rock@sos.ri.gov | Website: www.sos.ri.gov | Twitter: @RISecState
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From: Ken Block [mailto:kblock@simpaticosoftware.com]
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 2:49 PM
To: Rob Rock <rrock@sos.ri.gov>
Subject: RE: Proof of Citizenship

I used that because it is one of the easier ones to gin up, along with some of the paper documents listed in the next tier of identity “proof” documents like a utility bill or bank statement.

So in short, my scenario is possible.

In my opinion, this places an even greater burden on the State to ensure that registered voters actually exist. This idea that a passive mechanism like waiting for mail to bounce back is effective is conclusively wrong, based on the empirical data that I am sending you of votes occurring at clearly bad addresses.

Do you know generally if any state deals with my scenario in an active way (i.e. pushing all registered voters through an identity checking algorithm), or is everyone pretty much where we are?

From: Rob Rock [mailto:rrock@sos.ri.gov]
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 2:36 PM
To: 'Ken Block' <kblock@simpaticosoftware.com>
Subject: RE: Proof of Citizenship

Ken,
If John registers, a letter will be sent to 3 Altieri Way indicating that the voter is registered to vote. Ideally, the business would receive the letter and notify the Warwick Board of Canvassers that 3 Altieri Way is a business and that no one resides there. If not, John will be registered to vote from that address.
The cities/towns are responsible for their voter registration rolls, not the Secretary of State. A challenge to a voter’s registration would be handled by the local board of canvassers. The Secretary of State maintains the database but the validation of any and all voter registrations is done at the local level.

Voter ID cards do not list an address but anytime someone requests one, we ensure they are registered to vote by confirming with the CVRS. We do not do any background checks on a business ID card if one is presented. In the 5 years I have been issuing voter ID cards, I don’t recall anyone ever showing a business ID as back-up identification.

Rob

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From: Ken Block [mailto:kblock@simpaticosoftware.com]
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 2:23 PM
To: Rob Rock <rrock@sos.ri.gov>
Subject: RE: Proof of Citizenship

Thanks, Rob.

I want to run a scenario by you, in an attempt to ensure that I understand correctly how voter registration is handled in RI.

Let’s say I, for whatever reason, decided to attempt to register to vote a made up person and actually cast a vote using that person’s non-existent “identity”.

So I am going to create out of thin air “John Jacob Jingleheimerschmidt” born on 1/1/1970 and residing at 20 Altieri Way, #3 in Warwick, RI (that is the address of my business).

While filling out the voter registration form in John’s name, I do not enter any info for RI driver’s license or social security number.

As I understand how the voter registration process works right now, John would be duly registered to vote based on the information that I provided and no checks would be performed to prove or disprove that John either exists or is registered to vote at a residence.

As long as any voter mail sent to 20 Altieri Way, #3 is not returned as undeliverable, John’s registration will not be looked at by the SoS office unless it is challenged by someone outside of the SoS’ office.
To vote, someone assuming John’s “identity” would have to visit the SoS office and provide a photo card from any business, commercial establishment or health club in order to receive a voter ID card. John provides a photo ID card from a non-existent business.

Does the SoS office make any attempt to confirm the existence of the business for which a photo ID was produced?

At this point, John can vote in the next election, and will not be looked at again in terms of his eligibility to vote for any reason unless someone outside of the Secretary of State’s office specifically challenges his credentials.

Do I have this correct?

Thanks

Ken